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Christian List 
 
Abstract. Arrow's account (1951/1963) of the problem of social choice is based upon the assumption that the 
preferences of each individual in the relevant group are expressible by a single ordering. This paper lifts that 
assumption and develops a multidimensional generalization of Arrow's framework. I show that, like Arrow's original 
framework, the multidimensional generalization is affected by an impossibility theorem, highlighting not only the 
threat of dictatorship of a single individual, but also the threat of dominance of a single dimension. In particular, even 
if preferences are single-peaked across individuals within each dimension -- a situation called intradimensional 
single-peakedness -- any aggregation procedure satisfying Arrow-type conditions will make one dimension 
dominant. I introduce lexicographic hierarchies of dimensions as a class of possible aggregation procedures under 
intradimensional single-peakedness. The interpretation of the results is discussed. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The problem of social choice discussed here is the problem of aggregating the preferences of the 
individual members of a group into the corresponding preferences of the group as a whole. The 
problem is illlustrated by a committee decision or an election, where individuals explicitly 
express their preferences over the alternatives by casting their votes, from which the collective 
outcome is then obtained. The votes could be either each individual's self-regarding preferences, 
or each individual's judgment of what is best for the group as a whole. For notational simplicity, I 
will use the language of 'preferences'. 
 
Arrow's theorem (1951/1963) shows that there exists no procedure for aggregating individual 
preference orderings over a set of alternatives into collective, or social, ones where the procedure 
satisfies a set of arguably undemanding minimal conditions (transitivity of social orderings, 
universal domain, the weak Pareto principle, independence of irrelevant alternatives and non-
dictatorship). Arrow's theorem is based on the assumption of one-dimensionality, the assumption 
that the preferences of each individual are expressible in terms of a single ordering. This 
assumption requires the existence of a single relevant 'respect' or 'dimension', like overall 
preference, in terms of which each individual can rank-order any set of alternatives.  
 
The present paper lifts the assumption of one-dimensionality. We suppose that the preferences of 
each individual are expressed in terms of multiple orderings, one for each relevant dimension. I 
will show that, under this supposition, we are faced with a multidimensional Arrow problem. 
 2 
There exists no procedure for aggregating individual multidimensional preference orderings into 
social orderings in accordance with a set of Arrow-type minimal conditions. Like Arrow's one-
dimensional theorem, the multidimensional results highlight the threat of dictatorship of a single 
individual. But unlike Arrow's theorem, they also highlight the threat of dominance of a single 
dimension. Dominance and dictatorship are formally similar, yet their interpretation raises 
different issues, as discussed below.  
 
I will also ask whether an escape-route from the impossibility result that is well known in the 
one-dimensional case is also available in the multidimensional case, namely the escape-route via 
single-peakedness. The main theorem of this paper shows that, even if preferences are single-
peaked across individuals within each dimension -- a situation called intradimensional single-
peakedness -- any aggregation procedure satisfying Arrow-type conditions will make one 
dimension dominant. Intradimensional single-peakedness is, however, sufficient for avoiding a 
dictatorship of one individual. I will introduce the class of lexicographic hierarchies of 
dimensions as a class of possible aggregation procedures under intradimensional single-
peakedness.  
 
There is not much related work in the literature; multidimensionality is usually not developed as 
an interpretation, and single-peakedness is not addressed in this context.1 
 
In section 2, I will briefly discuss the political theory background of multidimensional social 
choice problems and the relevance of single-peakedness. In section 3, I will present the formal 
results, and in section 4, I will make some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Single-Peakedness and Multidimensionality 
 
The threat posed by Arrow's original one-dimensional theorem depends on how diverse the 
preferences across individuals are. If there is unanimity, aggregation is trivial. But although 
unanimity is sufficient for avoiding an impossibility result, it is not necessary. It is well known 
                                                          
1 Formally related to the present results are Roberts's (1995) results concerning the aggregation of multiple opinions 
about the welfare of a group of individuals into a single social ordering and Khmelnitskaya's (1999) and 
Khmelnitskaya and Weymark's (2000) results concerning social welfare orderings for different scales of individual 
utility measurement in distinct population subgroups. Precursors are results by Fishburn (1971) and Batra and 
Pattanaik (1972) on multi-stage majority decisions. In multi-stage majority decisions, a given profile of preference 
orderings across individuals is first partitioned into several (possibly nested) subprofiles; the overall outcome is then 
determined by (possibly nested) aggregation over the aggregate outcomes corresponding to the appropriate 
subprofiles. 
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that if preferences across individuals satisfy the structure condition of single-peakedness, 
aggregation in accordance with Arrow's conditions (apart from universal domain) is possible.2  
 
Single-peakedness may be interpreted as an implication of agreement at a meta-level, in the 
following sense. Agreement and disagreement are usually defined in terms of how substantively 
similar or dissimilar the preferences of different individuals are. But preferences may be different 
in substance, in that different individuals disagree on the rankings of options, and yet all 
individuals' preferences may be systematically aligned along the same common 'left'/'right' 
dimension. Each individual may have a most preferred position (possibly different for different 
individuals) on that dimension and rank options according to their distance from the most 
preferred position. Agreement on such a structuring dimension -- a form of agreement at a meta-
level -- implies single-peakedness (see also List, 2002).  
 
Miller (1992) argues that, when preferences are not single-peaked across individuals, this is 
caused by the combination of several normatively relevant issue-dimensions into a single 
preference ordering for each individual. The issue-dimensions which are collapsed into a single 
preference ordering, say on which industrial policy to pursue, could for instance be (1) economic 
growth, (2) employment, and (3) ecological sustainability. On Miller's account, a precondition for 
meaningful collective decisions is the identification of these multiple relevant issue-dimensions 
and the 'factorization' of overall preferences into dimension-specific preferences. Each individual 
would rank all options along each dimension separately, and these dimension-specific orderings 
would then form the basis of a collective choice. However, once dimension-specific individual 
preferences have been identified, we are still faced with a problem of aggregation, namely the 
problem of aggregating sets of dimension-specific orderings into corresponding collective 
orderings. This is precisely a multidimensional aggregation problem of the kind addressed in this 
paper. The main theorem stated below shows that, even in the best-case scenario from Miller's 
perspective, a multidimensional Arrow problem occurs, and I will discuss its implications.  
 
                                                          
2 See Black (1948) and Arrow (1951/1963). Other proposed structure conditions which are sufficient for aggregation 
in accordance with Arrow's conditions (apart from universal domain) are single-cavedness (Inada, 1964), separability 
into two groups (Inada, 1964), latin-square-lessness (Ward, 1965) and triplewise value-restriction (Sen, 1966). 
Triplewise value-restriction is the most general one of all these, being implied by, but not implying, each of the other 
conditions. 
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3. The Multidimensional Framework 
 
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be a set of individuals, and X = {x1, x2, ...} a set of alternatives. Suppose, 
further, that there are k relevant issue-dimensions, contained in K = {1, 2, ..., k}. We will assume 
n > 1, |X| > 2, and, unless stated otherwise, k > 1.3 
 
To each individual i∈Ν, there corresponds a k-tuple Ri := <Rij>j∈K = <Ri1, Ri2, ..., Rik> of personal 
preference orderings on X, one for each issue-dimension j∈K, where each Rij is reflexive, 
transitive and connected. For example, X might be a set of industrial policy alternatives and the 
numerals 1, 2 and 3 might represent the dimensions of economic growth, employment and 
ecological sustainability, respectively. Then Ri1, Ri2 and Ri3 would represent individual i's 
preference orderings of the policy alternatives from the perspectives of economic growth, 
employment and ecological sustainability, respectively. For each i∈N and each j∈K, the ordering 
Rij induces a strong ordering Pij and an indifference relation Iij, defined as follows: for all x1, 
x2∈X,  
 
x1Pijx2 if and only if x1Rijx2 and not x2Rijx1; 
x1Iijx2 if and only if x1Rijx2 and x2Rijx1. 
 
A profile of k-tuples of personal preference orderings is an n-tuple {Ri}i∈N = {R1, R2, ..., Rn} of 
such k-tuples, one for each individual in N. As a notational convention, {}-brackets will be used 
to denote n-tuples across individuals and <>-brackets to denote k-tuples across dimensions. 
  
A multidimensional social welfare function (MSWF) is a function F which maps each profile of k-
tuples of personal preference orderings (in a given domain), {Ri}i∈N, to a corresponding social 
ordering R = F({Ri}i∈N) on X, where R is required to be reflexive, transitive and connected. R also 
induces a strong ordering P and an indifference relation I, defined as above. In this framework, a 
one-dimensional social welfare function (SWF) is a MSWF for the case k=1. 
 
To derive a simple multidimensional Arrow theorem, we use the conditions of universal domain, 
the weak Pareto principle and independence of irrelevant alternatives, and we require that an 
                                                          
3 While the question of how the relevant dimensions are to be identified and demarcated (i.e. the question of how the 
set K is to be interpreted) is a very important philosophical and political matter, it will here be taken to lie outside the 
scope of social choice theory and will therefore be bracketed out. For a discussion of this question, see Dryzek and 
List (2002).  
 5 
acceptable MSWF be -- in a relevant sense -- non-dictatorial. The multidimensional 
generalization of the first three conditions is straightforward.  
 
Given any profile of k-tuples of personal preference orderings, {Ri}n∈N, we define R := 
F({Ri}n∈N). 
 
UNIVERSAL DOMAIN (U). The domain of F is the set of all logically possible profiles of k-tuples 
of personal preference orderings. 
 
WEAK PARETO PRINCIPLE (P). Let {Ri}i∈N be any profile in the domain of F. For any x1, x2∈X, 
we have x1Px2 whenever, for all i∈N and all j∈K, x1Pijx2. 
 
INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES (I). Let {Ri}i∈N and {R*i}i∈N be any profiles in 
the domain of F. Suppose x1, x2∈X such that, for all i∈N and all j∈K, x1Rijx2 if and only if 
x1R*ijx2. Then x1Rx2 if and only if x1R*x2. 
 
The multidimensional generalization of Arrow's non-dictatorship condition is less 
straightforward. In the multidimensional case, there are two issues to be addressed: the issue of 
dictatorship of an individual and the issue of dominance of a dimension. Non-dictatorship 
requires the non-existence of a fixed single individual such that whenever this individual strictly 
prefers option x1 to option x2 in all issue-dimensions, then the social ordering also ranks option x1 
strictly above option x2. Non-dominance requires the non-existence of a fixed single dimension 
such that whenever all individuals strictly prefer option x1 to option x2 in that issue-dimension, 
then the social ordering also ranks option x1 strictly above option x2. As we will see below, 
however, there are plausible situations in which social choice procedures violating non-
dominance are attractive. 
 
NON-DICTATORSHIP (D). There does not exist an individual i∈N (a dictator for F) such that, for 
all profiles {Ri}i∈N in the domain of F and all x1, x2∈X, [∀j∈K x1Pijx2] implies x1Px2. 
 
NON-DOMINANCE (DOM). There does not exist a dimension j∈K (a dominant dimension for F) 
such that, for all profiles {Ri}i∈N in the domain of F and all x1, x2∈X, [∀i∈N x1Pijx2] implies 
x1Px2. 
 
A double dictatorship is the situation in which the personal preference ordering of a fixed single 
individual in a fixed single dimension always determines the social ordering. 
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NON-DOUBLE-DICTATORSHIP (DD). There does not exist an individual i∈N and a dimension 
j∈K such that, for all profiles {Ri}i∈N in the domain of F and all x1, x2∈X, x1Pijx2 implies x1Px2. 
 
Arrow's original theorem immediately implies the following result: 
 
Theorem 1. There exists no MSWF satisfying (U), (P), (I) and (DD). 
 
This result is no surprise. If we extend Arrow's original framework by asking n individuals to 
submit k separate personal preference orderings (rather than one), allowing as much diversity as 
logically possible both within and across individuals, then effectively we are faced with a one-
dimensional Arrow problem for a group of nk individuals. 
 
However, the situation that Miller and others have in mind when arguing for solving social choice 
problems by identifying multiple relevant issue-dimensions is not the one captured by theorem 1 
and its underlying condition (U). The (empirical) claim, though not explicitly spelled out by 
Miller, is the following. Once multiple relevant issue-dimensions have been 'factored out', 
preferences along each separate issue-dimension are more likely to be single-peaked across 
individuals than the unstructured, non-singlepeaked, preferences which are the result of 
collapsing several issue-dimensions into one. Independently, Mueller (1989, pp. 89 - 90) argues 
that "[g]iven that we have a single-dimensional issue, single-peakedness does not seem to be that 
strong an assumption. What is implausible is the assumption that the issue space is one 
dimensional". On this account, introducing several dimension-specific orderings, each of which 
concerns only a single issue-dimension, would make it more likely that, for each separate 
dimension, the dimension-specific orderings are single-peaked across individuals. This situation 
is captured by the condition of intradimensional single-peakedness. 
 
First, define a profile {Ri}i∈N of one-dimensional personal preference orderings to be single-
peaked if there exists at least one strict linear ordering Ω of the alternatives in X (a structuring 
dimension) such that, for all i∈N and all x1, x2, x3∈X, if (x1Ω x2 and x2Ω x3) or (x3Ω x2 and x2Ω x1) 
(i.e. "x2 is between x1 and x3 on the structuring dimension defined by Ω"), then x1Rix2 implies 
x1Pix3 ("each individual's preference ordering has only one peak with respect to Ω") (Black, 1948; 
Arrow, 1951/1963). Let DS be the set of all single-peaked profiles of one-dimensional personal 
preference orderings.4 
                                                          
4 For simplicity, I will not address issues of indifference and unconcerned individuals here. However, the present 
results can be stated in a more general form, by extending DS along the lines discussed in Sen (1966).  
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INTRADIMENSIONAL SINGLE-PEAKEDNESS (ISP). The domain of F is the set of all profiles of k-
tuples of personal preference orderings, {Ri}i∈N, such that, for each j∈K, {Rij}i∈N∈DS. 
 
Given (ISP), the impossibility result of theorem 1 can be circumvented.  
 
Proposition 2. There exist MSWFs satisfying (ISP), (P), (I) and (D). 
 
A MSWF F is a lexicographic hierarchy of dimensions if there exist k one-dimensional SWFs, 
G1, G2, ..., Gk (possibly different), defined on the domain DS and satisfying (P), (I) and (D), and a 
permutation σ of K such that, for any {Ri}i∈N in the domain of F and any x1, x2∈X,  
 
 x1Px2  if and only if  
   x1P*σ(j)x2 for some j∈K 
  and  x1I*σ(h)x2 for all h<j, 
 
where, for each j∈K, R*j = Gj({Rij}i∈N).  
 
Suitably defined lexicographic hierarchies of dimensions satisfy the conditions of proposition 2, 
for instance, lexicographic hierarchies with all Gj defined as pairwise majority voting (i.e. for 
each j, Gj is defined as follows: for any x1, x2∈X, x1R*jx2 if and only if the number of individuals 
with x1Rijx2 is at least as large as the number of individuals with x2Rijx1). While lexicographic 
hierarchies of dimensions do not make a fixed single individual dictatorial, they violate condition 
(DOM) in that they install a fixed dominance hierarchy of dimensions. The overall social ordering 
is determined, first, exclusively on the basis of the dimension-specific profile {Rij}i∈N for the 
highest ranked dimension; if there are ties, the dimension-specific profile for the second highest 
ranked dimension acts as a tie-breaker; if there are still ties, the dimension-specific profile for the 
third highest ranked dimension acts as a tie-breaker, and so on.  
 
Are there any MSWFs satisfying the conditions of proposition 2 and condition (DOM)? The main 
theorem of this paper shows that the answer to this question is negative, even if we do not insist 
on condition (D). 
 
Theorem 3. There exists no MSWF satisfying (ISP), (P), (I) and (DOM). 
 
A proof is given in the appendix. Theorem 3 implies that, if the individuals rank different 
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industrial policies separately on the three dimensions of economic growth, employment and 
ecological sustainability and these dimension-specific rankings are single-peaked across 
individuals, any MSWF defined on the resulting domain and satisfying (P) and (I) will make one 
of the three dimensions dominant and use the other dimensions at most as tie-breakers. However, 
in some cases decision-makers might reach agreement on the relative importance of the three 
dimensions, thereby making the use of a lexicographic hierarchy of dimensions defensible.  
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
 
A full escape-route from the multidimensional Arrow problem via intradimensional single-
peakedness is unavailable.5 Miller's proposal on solving impossibility problems of social choice 
by identifying multiple relevant issue-dimensions therefore requires some elaboration. Even if we 
grant the (empirical) claim that 'factoring out' multiple relevant issue-dimensions helps to 
generate a situation of intradimensional single-peakedness, the problem of aggregating across 
these dimensions is not easily soluble. We have seen that (lexicographic) hierarchies of 
dimensions are the only formal solutions to that problem. Sometimes decision-makers can agree 
not only on what the relevant issue-dimensions are, but also on how to rank them in an order of 
importance. In such cases, lexicographic hierarchies of dimensions may be attractive solutions to 
multidimensional social choice problems. Often, however, there is as much, or even more, 
disagreement about issue-priority than about the actual ranking of options within each issue-
dimension. A study by Budge, Robertson and Hearl (1987), for instance, suggests that electoral 
competition is often concerned more with matters of issue-priority than with the question of what 
the best option on a given issue-dimension is. If so, no lexicographic hierarchy of dimensions will 
command the assent of all decision-makers. Sometimes it is possible to subdivide the decision 
into several dimension-specific sub-decisions, for instance one on economic aspects, one on 
employment aspects, and one on ecological aspects, and, given intradimensional single-
peakedness, separate dimension-specific aggregation raises no Arrow problem. This route in 
effect 'defines away' the multidimensional Arrow problem, by not aggregating preferences across 
multiple dimensions. But whenever decisions come in 'packages' and cannot be subdivided into 
separate dimension-specific subdivisions, this route is unavailable, and we are faced with a 
                                                          
5 Of course, a stronger condition of overall single-peakedness, or a suitably defined condition of interdimensional 
single-peakedness in addition to intradimensional single-peakedness, would provide a full escape-route from the 
multidimensional Arrow problem. However, it is unclear whether such a stronger condition would be as empirically 
plausible as the condition of intradimensional single-peakedness. Suppose that the motivation for 'factoring out' 
multiple relevant issue-dimensions is the lack of single-peakedness in the overall preferences of the individuals. 
Then the reason for expecting dimension-specific preferences to be more likely to be single-peaked across 
individuals than overall preferences is precisely that overall preferences are determined by more than one formal 
structuring dimension (corresponding to different substantive issue-dimensions).  
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problem to which there is no straightforward solution (for a discussion of these issues in the 
context of a deliberative democracy, see Dryzek and List, 2002).  
 
This paper can only hint at some of the implications of the multidimensional Arrow problem.6 
But, as in the famous one-dimensional case, there is one conclusion that should not be drawn, 
namely that meaningful collective decision making is impossible. Rather, the multidimensional 
Arrow problem should once again challenge us to explore the question of how collective decision 
making is affected by the constraints highlighted by Arrow's theorem. 
 
Appendix. Proof of Theorem 3 
 
Theorem 3 follows immediately from the following result concerning one-dimensional SWFs (i.e. 
MSWFs for k=1). 
 
Let (U), (P), (I), (D) be Arrow's one-dimensional conditions of universal domain, the weak Pareto 
principle, independence of irrelevant alternatives, non-dictatorship, respectively (i.e. the 
conditions stated in section 3 for k=1). Given any {Ri}i∈N, define R := F({Ri}i∈N). 
 
STRUCTURED DOMAIN ASSUMPTION (SDA). N = N1 ∪  N2 ∪ ... ∪ Nk (k>1) such that, for each i, 
Ni ≠ ∅ and, for each i, j, i ≠ j implies Ni ∩ Nj = ∅. The domain of F contains all profiles of 
personal preference orderings, {Ri}i∈N, with the property that, for each j, {Ri}i∈Nj∈DS. 
 
M⊆N is almost decisive over some pair of alternatives x, y∈X if and only if, for all {Ri}i∈N in the 
domain of F, 
[[∀i∈M xPiy] & [∀i∈N \ M yPix]] ⇒ xPy.  
 
M⊆N is decisive over some pair of alternatives x, y∈X if and only if, for all {Ri}i∈N in the domain 
of F, 
[∀i∈M xPiy] ⇒ xPy. 
 
                                                          
6 List (2001) shows that, like Arrow's original result, the multidimensional results depend crucially on certain 
informational assumptions, specifically, assumptions on measurability, interpersonal comparability and 
interdimensional commensurability of individual preferences (or welfare). While each of interpersonal comparability 
and interdimensional commensurability alone is not sufficient for avoiding an impossibility result, the conjunction of 
suitable interpersonal comparability and suitable interdimensional commensurability is sufficient for the existence of 
aggregation procedures satisfying non-dictatorship and non-dominance as well as other Arrow-type conditions. 
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Theorem. Suppose F is a SWF satisfying (SDA), (P) and (I). Then there exists a fixed j∈{1, 2, 
..., k} such that Nj is decisive over all pairs x, y∈X. 
 
Proof. Suppose F satisfies (SDA), (P) and (I).  
 
Step (1). We will show that there exists a fixed j∈{1, 2, ..., k} such that Nj is almost decisive over 
all pairs x, y∈X. Construct a SWF G for a k-individual society as follows. For each logically 
possible {Rj}j∈{1, 2, ..., k}, define a corresponding {R*i}i∈N such that, for each i∈N, R*i := Rj where 
j is chosen from {1, 2, ..., k} such that i∈Nj. Note that the mapping from {Rj}j∈{1, 2, ..., k} to {R*i}i∈N 
is an injection. Note further that, for each j, {R*i}i∈Nj is a profile of identical orderings, and so 
{R*i}i∈N is contained in the domain of F (as defined by (SDA)). Now define G({Rj}j∈{1, 2, ..., k}) := 
F({R*i}i∈N). By construction, G satisfies (U). Since F satisfies (P) and (I), so does G. So G 
satisfies the conditions of Arrow's (one-dimensional) theorem, and there exists j∈{1, 2, ..., k} 
such that, for all {Rj}j∈{1, 2, ..., k} and all x, y∈X, xPjy implies xPy, where R = G({Rj}j∈{1, 2, ..., k}). 
Now let {R*i}i∈N be a profile such that [∀i∈Nj xP*iy] and [∀i∈N \ Nj yP*ix]. Since F satisfies (I), 
the rankings of any alternatives other than x and y are irrelevant to the relative ranking of x and y, 
and we may assume, without loss of generality, that, for each j, {R*i}i∈Nj is a profile of identical 
orderings. Consider the profile {Rj}j∈{1, 2, ..., k} to which {R*i}i∈Nj corresponds. Since xPjy and j is a 
dictator for G, we must have xPy, where R = G({Rj}j∈{1, 2, ..., k}) = F({R*i}i∈N). Hence Nj is almost 
decisive over all pairs x, y∈X.  
 
Step (2). Suppose Nj is almost decisive over all pairs x, y∈X. Given any pair x, y∈X, we will show 
that Nj is decisive over x, y. Let {Ri}i∈N be a profile such that, for all i∈Nj, xPiy. Consider a new 
profile {R*i}i∈N with the following properties:  
(i) for all i∈N, xR*iy ⇔ xRiy and yR*ix ⇔ yRix; 
(ii) z is a third alternative such that, for all i∈Nj, xP*iz and zP*iy, and, for all i∈N \ Nj, zP*ix 
and zP*iy; 
(iii) all other alternatives are ranked relative to x, y, z in such a way that {R*i}i∈N is single-
peaked. 
The following table illustrates that a profile {R*i}i∈N  with properties (i), (ii) and (iii) exists.  
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      xPiy, i∈Nj        xPiy, i∈N \ Nj    yPix, i∈N \ Nj           xIiy, i∈N \ Nj 
 ⇓        ⇓             ⇓       ⇓ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           R*i        R*i                R*i        R*i 
Table 1 
 
Property (iii) implies that, for each j, {R*i}i∈Nj is single-peaked, so that {R*i}i∈N is contained in 
the domain of F (as defined by (SDA)). Let R = F({Ri}i∈N) and R* = F({R*i}i∈N). Since F 
satisfies (I), property (i) implies that xP*y ⇔ xPy. Since Nj is almost decisive over all pairs in X, 
Nj is almost decisive over x, z, and property (ii) implies that xP*z. Since F satisfies condition (P), 
property (ii) further implies that zP*y. By transitivity of P*, it follows that xP*y, and thus xPy, as 
required. Q.E.D. 
 
The present proof strategy is related to the proof strategy of a result by Khmelnitskaya and 
Weymark (2000, theorem 2, hereafter K&W) concerning social welfare orderings for different 
scales of individual utility measurement in distinct population subgroups. In both proofs, the set 
of individuals is first partitioned into k subsets. In the present proof, each subset is a set of 
individuals such that the corresponding subprofile of personal preference orderings is single-
peaked. In K&W, each subset is a set of individuals with a common scale of individual utility 
measurement. The first step of both proofs considers pairwise rankings where preferences (here) 
or utilities (K&W) over the relevant pair of options are identical within each subset of the 
partition. A standard Arrow-type theorem is then applied to show that, for the considered special 
pairwise rankings, one subset of individuals is decisive. In a following step, this decisiveness 
result for special pairwise rankings is generalized to any pairwise ranking by constructing suitable 
auxiliary options (here) or auxiliary utility vectors across individuals (K&W) in such a way that 
(i) the decisiveness result of the first step applies to pairwise rankings involving the constructed 
auxiliary options or utility vectors and (ii) these pairwise rankings, combined with Pareto 
dominance considerations, induce the require pairwise rankings in the given more general case. 
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